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Abstract
Several European countries and many Japanese local governments began including endoge-
nous minimum prices (EMPs) in ￿rst-price auctions (FPAs) in their public procurements. The
EMP is calculated based on its relation to the average of all bids or to some lowest bids. Any
bid lower than the EMP is considered abnormally low and is excluded from the procurement
procedure. Producers who join this new auction institution have the incentive to raise their bids
and pull up the EMP in order to exclude others. A theoretical analysis reveals that the EMP
does not affect winning bids but changes the Nash equilibria of the standard FPA that does not
have any minimum prices. A laboratory analysis reveals that the winning bids of this new auc-
tion institution (i) are close to the production cost and coincide with those of the standard FPA
under the identical cost condition and (ii) are higher than the lowest production cost and those
of the standard FPA under our different cost condition when subjects’ identi￿cations and bids
are revealed.
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In recent public procurements, several European countries and many Japanese local govern-
ments have introduced minimum prices that have been calculated based on their relation to the
average of all bids or some lowest bids in ￿rst-price auctions (FPAs)1. In this auction institu-
tion, any bid lower than the minimum price is excluded and the winning bid is the lowest among
bids higher than the minimum price. According to the European Commission’s report (1999),
Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece recognize (and/or suspect) a tender as being abnor-
mally low "if the price offered is less by a certain percentage than the average of the tenders
submitted or discounts granted, with various differences in the percentage and/or calculation
of the average".
Although there are several methods to calculate minimum prices, in this paper we refer
to minimum prices based on their relation to the average of all bids or some lowest bids as
endogenous minimum prices (EMPs); we investigate their performance using theory and lab-
oratory experiment. Basically, the EMP excludes abnormally low bids that cannot satisfy the
quality of public work that the auction authorities require. The EMP is, however, often criti-
cized by legal and political sides as curbing fair competition. For instance, the European Court
of Justice said that "tenders may not automatically be excluded if they deviate more than a ￿xed
percentage rate from the average of all other tenders submitted2".
Since the EMP is determined by its relation to the average bids, producers who join this
auction institution have an incentive to raise their bids and pull up the minimum price to exclude
others and become a winner. In this case, the winning bid is likely to be higher than its cost
which is the best outcome for the government and taxpayers to minimize their expenditure.
For example, let EMP = 0.8 ￿ average of the three lowest bids. This kind of method of
calculation is popular among Japanese local governments. The ranking of bids is presented in
Table 1. In this case, the EMP is $103, the winner is Bidder 2, and the winning bid is $105.
However, if Bidder 3 whose bid is $130 raises his/her bid to $149, the EMP becomes $ 106 and
he/she can be the winner.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Table 1 is around here
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Although this is a rough example, it indicates the risk of taxpayers wasting their money.
Especially in Japan, the total contract price of public procurement for all local governments
from 2005 to 2007 is approximately 24 trillion yen (229 billion US dollars)3, whereas that for
the central government is about 7 trillion yen (67 billion US dollars)4. Therefore, the EMP is
likely to result in huge social losses in Japan. This situation would be more serious in the EU
because the EU has a wider economy than Japan does. To con￿rm this, we theoretically analyze
the Nash equilibria in the FPA with EMP. We ￿nd that the EMP does not affect the winning bids
of the standard FPA that does not have any minimum prices but expands its Nash equilibria as
including the Nash equilibria such that bi < c; for some i:
1Ohno and Harada (2006) compare public procurement systems in Japan with systems in the US and the EU.
2Refer to Judgement of 18 June 1991 in case C-295/89 ￿Alonso￿; judgement of 26 October 1995 in case C-
143/94 ￿Furlanis￿; and judgement of 16 October 1997 in case C-304/96 ￿Genova￿.
31 US dollar = 105 Japanese yen.
4Original data are obtained from the websites of East Japan Construction Surety Co., Ltd; Hokkaido Construc-
tion Surety Co., Ltd; and West Japan Construction Surety Co., Ltd.
1To verify the above theoretical results, we use experimental methods that feature three treat-
ment variables￿minimum prices (the EMP vs. no-minimum price), production costs (identical
vs. different), and the information of subjects’ identi￿cations and bids (disclosure vs. nondis-
closure). In the identical cost condition, the winning bids in both the FPA with EMP and the
standard FPA are consistent with the cost regardless of disclosing the information of subjects’
identi￿cations and bids. In the different cost condition, when the information of subjects’ iden-
ti￿cations and bids is disclosed, the winning bids of the FPA with EMP diverge from the lowest
cost and are signi￿cantly higher than those of the standard FPA. In the latter condition, since
most producers bid higher than their costs and the EMP becomes higher than the lowest cost,
producers with the lowest cost bid higher prices than their costs not to be excluded by the EMP.
Thus, winning bids become higher than the lowest cost.
We are only aware of two literatures that analyze the EMP. The ￿rst is Calveras et al. (2004),
who theoretically show that even in the second-price auction, producers with a small amount
of initial cash can make a pro￿t by bidding low and declaring bankruptcy if the cost is found
to be high. Under this assumption, they brie￿y suggest that the EMP employed in European
countries does not work well. Second, Decarolis (2009) theoretically shows that the auction
authorities prefer average bid auctions employed in European countries than the FPA when
their monitoring cost is high, and empirically analyzes the monitoring cost in Italy. Therefore,
our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the ￿rst experiment evaluating the performance of
the EMP.
In the procurement auction experiments, when costs are independent private values, Cox
et al. (1996) observe that too-low bids in the FPA lead to cost overruns when post-acution
cost is uncertainty, and Brosig and Rei￿ (2007) show that bids are lower than the theoretical
predictions. On the other hand, when the cost is common knowledge, Saijo et al. (1996),
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002), Kawagoe (2003), and Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2004) ￿nd
that the FPA mostly works well, except for the case in which they allow collusion or disclose
losing bids. In Japan, since only local governments employ the EMP and their procurement
auctions are held in a restricted area, the wages and rental costs of producing homogenous
goods do not vary and the production cost is common knowledge among producers. Therefore,
in this paper, we assume that goods are homogenous and those costs are common knowledge
among producers; we then analyze the Nash equilibria5.
Nevertheless, intheprocurementauction, thequalityofpublicconstructionisanon-negligible
issue. Optimal auction schemes considering quality have been studied by Sinclair-Desgagne
(1990), Dasgupta and Spulber (1990), Che (1993), Von Ungern-Sternberg (1994), Manelli and
Vincent (1995), and Naegelen (2002)6. They reveal that private information on producers’
quality leads to the distortion of social welfare. This paper is, however, the ￿rst step towards
evaluating the performance of the EMP. Therefore, we simplify our model setting to focus on
price competition, and release our attention from quality7.
Apart from the procurement auction, from the viewpoint of price controls, price ￿oors and
ceilings have been studied by Isaac and Plott (1981) and Smith and Williams (1981). They
￿nd that non-binding price controls affect the competitive equilibrium in the double auction
5We restrict our attention to the winner’s curse in Vesteg et al. (2009), who ￿nd that the EMP prevents the
winner’s curse and that the effect is magni￿ed as the number of bidders increases.
6Although Dasgupta and Spulber (1990) consider ￿exible quantity instead of quality in their context, their
quality context can be read as quality in our context.
7We explicitly introduce the quality of goods in the procurement auction model of Akai et al. (2009a). They
￿nd that an FPA without any regulation induces low-quality goods because of the producer’s corner-cutting.
2experiment. Coursey and Smith (1983) observe the same result in the posted offer market, and
Gode and Sunder (2004) present a simple dynamic model with ￿zero-intelligence￿ traders to
explain this discrepancy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model and hypotheses.
Section 3 details the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 analyzes the results, and
Section 5 contains the conclusion and discussion.
2. THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS
2.1. THEORETICAL MODEL
A rule of the FPA with EMP is simply described as follows. Consider that n producers who
join this procurement auction. Let p be the reservation price determined by a government in
advance. Denote producer i’s bid by bi 2 [0;p], and let this bid function be continuous. A bid
pro￿le is n-tuple b = (b1;:::;bn) 2 [0;p]n. Given a bid pro￿le b = (b1;:::;bn), denote the ￿rst
lowest bid by b1, the second lowest bid by b2, and so on. Given a bid pro￿le b, 2 ￿ m < n,
and k 2 (0;1), denote the average bid am(b) = [b1+￿￿￿+bm]=m of the m lowest bids and the
minimum price d(b) = k￿am(b)8. When a bid pro￿le is b, the winner is a producer whose bid
is the lowest between d(b) and p inclusively, and the winning bid is his/her bid. In case of a tie,
such producers win with equal probability.
Procurement auctions for Japanese local governments are held with the same sets of produc-
ers who work in the same cities or prefectures. Since wages and rental costs do not generally
vary in local areas and a reference book for estimating public constructions is freely available,
we assume that every producer has an identical cost c to produce a homogenous good, and the
cost is common knowledge among producers9. The winning bid in the Nash equilibrium is
described in Proposition 1 below, with the proof in Appendix.
PROPOSITION 1. If a bid pro￿le b is a Nash equilibrium, the winning bid coincides with the
cost:
In the following example, we divide the Nash equilibria of the FPA with EMP into two
cases in order to compare it with the Nash equilibria of the standard FPA that does not have any
minimum prices. In Case I, we show the Nash equilibria such that all bids are not less than the
cost, that is, bi ￿c; for every i. This condition is satis￿ed if the bid pro￿le is a Nash equilibrium
in the standard FPA because any producer bidding less than the cost obtains negative payoffs. In
Case II, we show the Nash equilibria such that some bids are less than the cost, that is, bi <c; for
some i: Although there is no Nash equilibrium that satis￿es this condition in the standard FPA,
there are many Nash equilibria that satisfy this condition in the FPA with EMP as described in
the example below.
EXAMPLE 1:Let n = 5; k = 0:8; m = 3; p = 243; and c = 97:
8In Akai et al. (2009b), we classify the EMP into four types: (i) k = 1 and m < n, (ii) k = 1 and m = n, (iii)
k < 1 and m < n, and (iv) k < 1 and m = n: If the cost is identical, Type (iii) of the EMP that we introduce in this
paper is the most ef￿cient for the governments and taxpayers to minimize their expenditures.
9In this environment, auction is playing fair institution as authorities justify that they do not choose a contractor
arbitrarily.
3Case I: Nash equilibria such that bi ￿ c; for every i: Consider a bid pro￿le b = (97; 97;
130; 150; 160): The minimum price is d(b) = 0:8￿(97+97+130)=3 = 86:4; and the winner
is one of the producers bidding 97. If one of the producers bidding 97 raises his/her bid to 130,
then since the minimum price becomes d(b)=0:8￿(130+97+130)=3=95:2 and still remains
less than 97, he/she cannot exclude the other producer bidding 97. If a producer raises his/her
bid to 150, then since the minimum price becomes d(b) = 0:8￿(150+97+130)=3 = 100:5
and still remains less than 130, he/she cannot exclude the producers bidding less than 130.
A producer cannot affect the minimum price by raising his/her bid to a price more than 150.
If the producer bidding 130 raises his/her bid to 150, then since the minimum price becomes
d(b) = 0:8￿(97+97+150)=3 = 91:7 and still remains less than 97, he/she cannot exclude the
producers bidding 97. In this bid pro￿le, nobody has an incentive to raise the bid and exclude
others. Hence, this bid pro￿le is a Nash equilibrium, and the winning bid coincides with the
cost of 97.
Next, consider a bid pro￿le b = (97;97;130;220;230). Since b4 = 220 is much higher than
b3 =130, the producerbidding b3 =130can excludethe producersbidding97 byraising his/her
bid to b4 =220. Thus, this bid pro￿le is not a Nash equilibrium. In this auction institution, since
b4 is the same as the price ceiling for producers bidding less than b4, b4 should not be so high
that the producers bidding prices less than b4 cannot exclude others if a bid pro￿le is a Nash
equilibrium.
Case II: Nash equilibria such that bi < c; for some i: Consider a bid pro￿le b = (1; 97;
97; 150; 200): The minimum price is d(b) = 0:8￿(1+97+97)=3 = 52; and the winner is one
of the producers bidding 97. If the producer bidding 1 raises his/her bid to 97, then since his/her
payoffs still remain 0, he/she does not have an incentive to deviate from this bid pro￿le. If a
producer raises his/her bid to 150, then since the minimum price becomes d(b) = 0:8￿(150+
97+97)=3 = 91:7 and still remains less than 97, he/she cannot exclude the producers bidding
97. If the producer bidding 97 raises his/her bid to 150, then since the minimum price becomes
d(b) = 0:8￿(1+97+150)=3 = 66:1 and still remains less than 97, he/she cannot exclude the
other producers bidding 97. Thus, nobody can affect the minimum price if the producer raises
his/her bid more than 150. Hence, this bid pro￿le is a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, there are
many Nash equilibria such that some bids are less than the cost.
Although the EMP expands the Nash equilibria of the standard FPA, winning bids coin-
cide with the cost. That is, the governments and taxpayers can minimize their expenditures
throughout this auction institution. Based on the discussion above, we propose hypotheses in
the experimental parameter values.
2.2. HYPOTHESES
In the experiment, we set the minimum price as 0:8￿ average of the lowest 5 bids of 10 pro-
ducers (k = 0:8, m = 5, and n = 10)10. We allow the subjects playing the roles of producers
to bid only nonnegative integers. To evaluate the performance of the EMP, we compare the
winning bids with those of the standard FPA in the identical cost condition and the different
cost condition.
First, we propose hypotheses in the identical cost condition. In the identical cost condition,
we set every producer’s cost as 97 (c = 97). By Proposition 1, the winning bid coincides with
10This is the ￿rst rule employed by the Japanese local governments.
4the cost of 97. Notice that since bids are only integers, a bid pro￿le b1 = ￿￿￿ = b10 = 98 is also
a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we obtain the following hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 1. In the identical cost condition, the winning bid is 97 or 98.
In the standard FPA, the winning bid also coincides with the cost of 97. Additionally, since
bids are only integers, a bid pro￿le b1 = ￿￿￿ = b10 = 98 is also a Nash equilibrium. Therefore,
we obtain the following hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 2. In the identical cost condition, the winning bids in the FPA with EMP coincide
with the ones in the standard FPA.
Next, we consider the winning bids in the different cost condition. Here, we consider the
situation that some big nationwide companies newly join procurement auctions for local gov-
ernments and they have the power to cut wages and rental costs much more than small localized
companies do. We introduce this situation into the laboratory and set producer i’s cost as 97
(ci = 97, i = 2;5;8) and producer j’s cost as 150 (cj = 150, j 6= i)11.
Since there are many Nash equilibria in the different cost condition, it is complicated to
describe all of them. First, we analyze the winning bid in the Nash equilibrium in Proposition
2 below, with proofs in Appendix. Next, we present an example of the Nash equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 2. Let c1 ￿ c2 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ cn. If a bid pro￿le b is a Nash equilibrium, the winning
bid coincides with the lowest cost c1.
PROPOSITION 3. In the different cost condition, there is no Case I pure Nash equilibrium such
that bi ￿ ci; for every i.
The proof of Proposition 3 is provided in supplementary materials. To explain the above
proposition intuitively, consider a bid pro￿le b such that every producer whose cost is 97 bids
97 and every producer whose cost is 150 bids 150. If the producer bidding 97 raises his/her
bid to 149, he/she can pull the minimum price above 97 and be the winner. Therefore, the
producers whose costs are 97 have the incentives to raise their bids more than 97 not to be
excluded. However, they also keep incentives to reduce their bids to win because there are three
producers whose costs are 97. Hence, they trade off raising and reducing their bids. Thus, there
is no Case I pure Nash equilibrium such that every producer bids a price more than or equal to
the cost. There are only Case II pure Nash equilibria such that bi <ci; for some i in the example
below.
EXAMPLE 2. Case II: Nash equilibria such that bi < c; for some i: Consider a bid pro￿le b
such that producers 2, 5, and 8 whose costs are 97 bid 97, producer 1 whose cost is 150 bids 1,
and the remaining producers whose costs are 150 bid 150, that is, b=(1; 97; 150; 150; 97; 150;
150; 97; 150; 150). In this bid pro￿le, the minimum price is 0:8￿(97+97+97+1+150)=5 =
70:7; and the winner is one of the producers bidding 97. Since nobody can pull the minimum
price above 97, this bid pro￿le is a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, there are many Case II Nash
equilibria such that some bids are extremely low.
Notice that since bids are only integers in the experiment, there are Nash equilibria such that
the wining bid is 98. For example, a bid pro￿le b such that producers 2, 5, and 8 whose costs
11Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) ￿nd that price competition works well when the number of competitors is
three. We follow their idea and allocate the lower cost to three producers.
5are 97 bid 98, producer 1 whose cost is 150 bids 1, and the remaining producers whose costs are
150 bid 150, that is, b = (1; 98; 150; 150; 98; 150; 150; 98; 150; 150) is a Nash equilibrium12.
Therefore, we obtain the following hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 3. In the different cost condition, the winning bid is 97 or 98.
In the standard FPA, the winning bid also coincides with the lowest cost of 97. Additionally,
since bids are only integers, a bid pro￿le such that producers 2, 5, and 8 bid 98 (b2 = b5 = b8 =
98) and the others bid prices more than 98 is also a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we obtain the
following hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 4. In the different cost condition, the winning bids in the FPA with EMP coincide
with the ones in the standard FPA.
In the different cost condition, although the Nash equilibria in the FPA with EMP are dif-
ferent from those in the standard FPA, the winning bids are same. From the above hypotheses,
there is no difference in the winning bids between the FPA with EMP and the standard FPA in
the both cost conditions.
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
3.1. DESIGN
Each session proceeded through a sequence of 10 procurement periods and comprised 10 pro-
ducers who had the same homogenous good13. Each subject bid only one selling price per
period, and the experimenter bought only one unit of good per period with the reservation price
of 243 points of experimental cash. The winner produced a good and earned pro￿ts equal to
selling price minus cost; other producers did not produce a good and earned zero pro￿ts for that
period14.
Our experiment features three treatment variables￿minimum prices, production costs, and
the information of subjects’ identi￿cations and bids. The minimum prices of our most interest
have two conditions￿the no-minimum price condition and the EMP condition. In the no-
minimum price condition, we employed the standard FPA that does not have any minimum
prices. In this condition, the winner was the producer whose bid was the lowest among bids
12Since bids are only integers in the experiment, there are several nonessential Nash equilibria. For
example, consider a bid pro￿le b such that producer 2 bids 120, producer 5 bids 130, producer 8 bids
145, producer 1 bids 97, producer 3 bids 121, and the remaining producers bid 145, that is, b =
(97;120;121;145;130;145;145;145;145;145): The minimum price is d(b) = 0:8 ￿ (97 + 120 + 121 + 130 +
145)=5 = 98:0, and the winner is the producer bidding 121. If the producer bidding 97 raises his/her bid to 120
and wins, since his/her cost is 150, he/she obtains negative payoffs. If the producer bidding 121 reduces his/her
bid to 120 and wins, since his/her cost is 150, he/she obtains negative payoffs. If the producer bidding 130 reduces
his/her bid to 120, since the minimum price d(b) = (97+120+121+120+145)=5 = 120:6; he/she cannot be the
winner. Thus, nobody has an incentive to change the bid, such that this bid pro￿le is a Nash equilibrium. However,
essentially, the winning bid coincides with the lowest cost of 97 in the Nash equilibrium.
13In Japan, the EMP is often employed when the number of bidders is more than 10. Producers who join the
procurement auction with the EMP award a contract roughly once a year. To capture this situation, we conduct an
experiment such that a subject wins once with equal probability in the identical cost condition.
14We used the term selling price instead of bid and avoided terms such as winners and winning bids in the
instructions.
6not more than the reservation price, and the winning bid was his/her bid. In case of a tie, such
producers won with equal probability. This was the benchmark control condition.
In the EMP condition, we employed the FPA with EMP. The EMP was 80% of the average
of the ￿ve lowest bids among ten producers. The winner was the producer whose bid was the
lowest between the reservation price and EMP inclusively, and the winning bid was his/her bid.
In case of a tie, such producers won with equal probability.
The production costs have two conditions￿the identical cost condition and the different
cost condition. In the identical cost condition, we announced that the production costs for all
producers were 97 points. In the different cost condition, we announced that the production
costs for three producers with identi￿cation numbers 2, 5, and 8 were 97 points and those of the
remaining producers were 150 points. In each condition, subjects were randomly assigned one
of the identi￿cation numbers and they remained in the same role throughout the session.
The information of subjects’ identi￿cations and bids has two conditions￿the disclosure
condition and the nondisclosure condition. In the procurement auctions for Japanese local
governments, producers work in a limited area and are well acquainted with each other. We
designed our experiments to assess this environment in the disclosure condition. To this end, in
the disclosure condition, at the beginning of the session, we wrote the seating chart of all the
producers on a whiteboard in order for the subjects to know which producer had which seat15.
After the winner was decided, we clearly announced each bid, in addition to writing it on
each seat of the seating chart16. After writing all the bids, in the no-minimum price condition,
the winning bid, winner’s identi￿cation number, and winner’s pro￿ts were displayed on each
subject’s screen. In the EMP condition, the winning bid, winner’s identi￿cation number, the
average of the ￿ve lowest bids, the minimum price, and winner’s pro￿ts were displayed on each
subject’s screen.
Since we examined the effect of information of subjects’ identi￿cations and bids, we did
not disclose the seating chart and all bids in the nondisclosure condition. After the winner was
decided, the same type of information provided in the disclosure condition was displayed on
each subject’s screen.
We used a full factorial design with 2 minimum price conditions ￿ 2 production cost condi-
tions ￿ 2 information conditions of subjects’ identi￿cations and bids. Table 2 summarizes our
eight cells. Each cell included two sessions. The N and E pre￿x in the session name indicate
the no-minimum price condition and the EMP condition, respectively. The -I- and -D- in the
middle of the session name indicate the identical cost condition and the different cost condition,
respectively. The -D- and -N- suf￿x indicate the disclosure condition and the nondisclosure
condition, respectively.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Table 2 is around here
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
3.2. PROCEDURES
The experiments were conducted in the PC laboratory of the Institute of Social and Economic
Research at Osaka University. A computerized interface was programmed with the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects included undergraduate and graduate students of Osaka
15In our laboratory, the subjects sitting at the rear can see the backs of the subjects sitting ahead of them.
16In Japan, some local governments that employ the EMP disclose all bids along with the companies’ names.
7University17. They were invited to sign up at designated websites by ￿yers posted around the
campusande-mailsolicitationssenttostudentswhohadsignedupforotherexperimentsbefore.
No one participated in more than one session.
Upon arrival, the subjects sat at separate computer terminals, and no communication was
permitted throughout the session. The instructions and PC operation manuals are provided in
the supplementary materials. Subjects listened to prerecorded instructions, while they followed
along on their own copies. Next, they privately read questions and answers about the instruc-
tions in 10 minutes to con￿rm the rules of the experiment18. Next, they listened to prerecorded
PC operation manuals, while they followed along on their own copies.
After the above procedures were completed, the producers’ identi￿cation numbers 1 to 10
were determined by a lottery, and each subject received a record sheet. We then provided 10
minutes for subjects to consider the strategy of subsequent auctions.
Then, period 1 began. All the subjects entered their selling price in the computer and their
record sheets within three minutes; this was done in each period. As soon as all the subjects
bid, the auction was automatically closed and the winner was decided even if three minutes had
not elapsed.
In the disclosure condition, we called each bid with an identi￿cation number and wrote
it on each seat of the seating chart on the whiteboard. In the nondisclosure condition, we
did not announce this information. In the no-minimum price condition, subjects entered the
winning bid, winner’s identi￿cation number, and their own pro￿ts in their record sheets. In the
endogenous minimum price condition, subjects entered the winning bid, winner’s identi￿cation
number, the average of the ￿ve lowest bids, the minimum price, and their own pro￿ts, in their
record sheets.
After period 10 was completed, the record sheets were collected, and their total pro￿ts were
calculated. Subjects were paid their experimental points in cash under the conversion rate of
1 point equal to 30 yen (29 cents)19. All the sessions lasted for approximately 1.5 hours, and
the earnings of the subjects ranged from 900 yen ($8.57) to 5,070 yen ($48.29), with a mean of
approximately 1,710 yen ($16.29).
4. RESULTS
We divide the results into two subsections. Section 4.1 presents the results of the identical cost
condition, and Section 4.2 presents the results of the different cost condition. We provide graphs
and raw data of the entire experiment in the supplementary materials.
17Subjects were a mixture of economics majors and noneconomics majors.
18Subjects sometimes ask about the detailed strategy of experiments, which might result in a bias in their de-
cision making in the subsequent auction periods. Since we prohibited any questions and excluded any biases, we
prepared questions and answers about instructions and distributed them to each subject.
19In cells N-I-N and E-I-N, although the conversion rate of 1 point was 30 yen (29 cents), we did not inform
the subjects about it. We announced that their initial experimental points were zero and that the higher their
experimental points, the more will be their earnings from the experiments. We ensured minimum payments even if
the ￿nal experimental points were less than or equal to zero in the questions and answers. The minimum payment
was 1500 yen ($14.28), which was equal to 50 points ￿ 30 yen (29 cents).
84.1. THE IDENTICAL COST CONDITION
First, we test Hypothesis 1. Figure 1a presents the average winning bids in cell N-I-D and the
average winning bids and the EMP in cell E-I-D. The horizontal axis represents the number of
periods and the vertical axis the price. The average winning bids in cells N-I-D and E-I-D are
very close to the theoretical prediction of 97 or 98. The median of the pooled winning bids
across the sessions is 98 in cells N-I-D and E-I-D20;21. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests do not reject
the null hypothesis that the median of the pooled winning bids across the sessions coincides
with the theoretical prediction of 98 in cells N-I-D and E-I-D (two-tailed p-values are 1.00 and
0.453, respectively)22.
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Figure 1b presents the average winning bids in cell N-I-N and the average winning bids and
the EMP in cell E-I-N. The average winning bids in cells N-I-N and E-I-N are very close to
the theoretical prediction of 97 or 98, except in the last period in cell N-I-N. The median of the
pooled winning bids across the sessions is 97 in cells N-I-N and E-I-N23. Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests do not reject the null hypothesis that the median of the pooled winning bids across the
sessions coincides with the theoretical prediction of 97 in cells N-I-N and E-I-N (two-tailed p-
values are 1.00 and 0.146, respectively). These results support Hypothesis 1. Hence, we obtain
the following result.
RESULT 1. In the identical cost condition, the winning bids in the FPA with EMP and those in
the standard FPA coincide with the theoretical prediction in both the information conditions.
Next, we test Hypothesis 2. The distributions of the average winning bid in cell N-I-N (N-I-
D) appear to be similar to those in cell E-I-N (E-I-D). Wilcoxon rank sum tests do not reject the
null hypothesis of no difference in the medians of the pooled winning bids across the sessions
between cells N-I-D and E-I-D (two-tailed p-value = 0.264) and do not reject the null hypothesis
of no difference in the medians of the pooled winning bids across the sessions between cells
N-I-N and E-I-N (two-tailed p-value = 0.209). These results support Hypothesis 2. Hence, we
obtain the following result.
RESULT 2. In the identical cost condition, the winning bids of the FPA with EMP coincide with
those of the standard FPA in both the information conditions.
Next, wefocusontheinformationeffectofsubjects’identi￿cationsandbidswithinthesame
auction institution. Wilcoxon rank sum tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no difference
20Throughout this section, we pool data across two sessions to increase the sample size to 20, which is suf￿cient
to conduct nonparametric tests. We also report the statistical results, comparing the distribution between two
sessions in each cell in each footnote.
21The Wilcoxon rank sum tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no differences in the distributions between
sessions in the cells N-I-D and E-I-D (two-tailed p-values are 0.69 and 0.15, respectively).
22Although the observations are not independent across the periods within a session, we use Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests to aid the reader’s interpretation of comparing with the theoretical prediction throughout this section.
23The Wilcoxon rank sum tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the distribution between
sessions in cell N-I-N (two-tailed p-value is 0.69) but reject it in cell E-I-N (two-tailed p-value is 0.04).
9in the medians of the pooled winning bids across the sessions between cells E-I-N and E-I-D
(two-tailed p-value = 0.128) but reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the medians of the
pooled winning bids across the sessions between cells N-I-N and N-I-D (two-tailed p-value =
0.002). Hence, we obtain the following result.
RESULT 3. In the identical cost condition, the winning bids of the FPA with EMP in the disclo-
sure condition coincide with those in the nondisclosure condition. However, the winning bids of
the standard FPA in the disclosure condition are slightly higher than those in the nondisclosure
condition.
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002) ￿nd, in their FPA experiment, that although winning bids
converge towards the theoretical prediction when they disclose only winning bids, winning bids
diverge from the theoretical prediction when they disclose losing bids. In contrast, the winning
bids of our standard FPA coincide with the theoretical prediction, and the differences of winning
bids between the two information conditions are very small.
The slight difference in the nondisclosure condition seems to be due to the different infor-
mation of payment schemes. In cells N-I-N and E-I-N, we did not provide a formula to calculate
cash rewards from experimental points. Some subjects tended to misunderstand their rewards
would be higher when they sold a good than when they did not sell it if their pro￿ts were neg-
ative. This misunderstanding motivates some subjects to bid prices lower than or equal to the
cost of 97 to win.
To avoid the aforementioned misunderstanding, we provide a formula to calculate their
rewards in cells N-I-D and E-I-D. It was easier for subjects to understand that negative payoffs
would reduce their rewards, so they tried to bid prices higher than the cost of 97 to earn positive
pro￿ts.
Since the number of bids less than or equal to 97 in cell N-I-N is more than that in cell N-I-
D, the different information about payment schemes seems to induce the difference of winning
bids between these cells. However, we do not observe these differences between cells E-I-N and
E-I-D. Although more experimental work is needed to obtain precise results, the information of
subjects’ identi￿cations and bids does not have a critical impact on the winning bids in either
auction institution.
The above results show that both auction institutions achieve the same winning bids. Next,
we shift our focus from price competition to evaluating the performance of EMP in relation to
the other reason why Japanese local governments employ the EMP, as described below.
Japanese local governments traditionally set the minimum price at 80￿90% of the reser-
vation price, which is generally estimated as the standard cost set by the governments. They
believe that the minimum price should be a benchmark of the quality of public works24. Many
Japanese local governments announce the reservation price and/or the minimum price in order
to achieve transparency and fairness25. This pre-announcement, however, creates the problem
of all producers who join this auction bidding the minimum price; the winner is selected by
lottery regardless of the real costs and qualities26. Even when they pre-announce only the reser-
24In Japan, the law of local government procurement requires reservation prices in order to avoid a situation in
which contract prices exceed the budget.
25According to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism’s survey (2007) of 1,874 local
governments, 64% of all local governments announced the reservation price in advance, and 65% of all local
governments employed the minimum price. Of these governments, 20% announced the minimum price in advance.
26According to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism’s survey (2006) of 1,826 local
governments that employed the minimum price from April 2003 to July 2004 (this frequency is about 56% of the
10vation price, the same problem occurs because producers can easily estimate the minimum price
from the traditional reservation price. Thus, not only in order to exclude abnormally low bids
but also to avoid selecting the winner by lottery, they have started to employ the EMP.
To test this performance, we compare the frequency of deciding winners by lottery between
the FPA with EMP and the standard FPA. The numbers pertaining to deciding the winner by
lottery are 13 and 10 in cells E-I-D and N-I-D, respectively. The proportion test does not
reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the frequencies of deciding the winner by lottery
between cells E-I-D and N-I-D (two-tailed p-value = 0.337). On the other hand, the numbers
pertaining to deciding the winner by lottery are 12 and 8 in cells E-I-N and N-I-N, respectively.
The proportion test does not reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the frequencies of
deciding the winner by lottery between cells E-I-N and N-I-N (two-tailed p-value = 0.205).
Hence, we obtain the following result.
RESULT 4. In the identical cost condition, there is no difference in the frequency of decid-
ing winners by lottery between the FPA with EMP and the standard FPA in both information
conditions.
As a result, the winners were decided by lottery in roughly half the periods in both auctions.
In the identical cost condition, the EMP does not affect the winning bids or the frequency
of deciding the winner by lottery. Next, we evaluate the effect of EMP in the different cost
condition.
4.2. THE DIFFERENT COST CONDITION
First, we test Hypothesis 3. Figure 2a presents the average winning bids in cell N-D-D and the
average winning bids and the EMP in cell E-D-D. The winning bids in cell E-D-D depart from
the theoretical predictions of 97 and 98. The medians of the pooled winning bids across the
sessions in cells N-D-D and E-D-D are 100 and 119.5, respectively27. Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests reject the null hypothesis that the medians of the pooled winning bids across the sessions
coincides with 97 or 98 at the 1% signi￿cance level in both the cells.
Figure 2b presents the average winning bids in cell N-D-N and the average winning bids and
the EMP in cell E-D-N. Both the winning bids tend to decrease toward the theoretical prediction
as the periods proceed. The medians of the pooled winning bids across the sessions in cells N-
D-N and E-D-N are 106 and 102, respectively28. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests reject the null
hypothesis that the median of the pooled winning bids across the sessions coincides with 97 or
98 at the 1% signi￿cance level in each cell.
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3,228 local governments existing at the time), 145 local governments decided the winner by lottery during that
period. This frequency is 61% of the 236 local governments that announced the minimum price in advance.
27The Wilcoxon rank sum tests reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the distribution between sessions in
cell N-D-N (two-tailed p-value is 0.01), but do not reject it in cell E-D-N (two-tailed p-value is 0.61).
28The Wilcoxon rank sum tests reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the distribution between sessions in
cell N-D-D (two-tailed p-value is 0.01), but do not reject it in cell E-D-N (two-tailed p-value is 0.79).
11The winning bids in cells N-D-N and E-D-N, however, appear to converge towards the
theoretical prediction of 98; those in cells N-D-D and E-D-D do not. We test whether the
winning bids converge towards the theoretical prediction. We de￿ne that the winning bids
converge towards the theoretical prediction if the slopes of the OLS regression of winning bids
on the number of periods are signi￿cantly negative and the winning bids in the last ￿ve periods
coincide with the theoretical prediction.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Table 3 is around here
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Table 3 presents the results of the OLS regression of the pooled winning bids across two
sessions on the number of periods in cells N-D-D, E-D-D, N-D-N, and E-D-N:
Winning bids = a+b￿Period+ε
In cells N-D-D and E-D-D, however, the slopes are not signi￿cant at the 5% level, and the
joint F-statistic tests of slopes and constants are not signi￿cant at the 5% level. The medians
of the pooled winning bids in the last ￿ve periods across the sessions are 100 and 116 in cells
N-D-D and E-D-D, respectively. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests reject the null hypothesis that the
medians of the pooled winning bids in the last ￿ve periods across the sessions coincides with
98 in cells N-D-D and E-D-D (two-tailed p-values are 0.015 and 0.002, respectively). These
results do not support Hypothesis 3, that is, winning bids do not converge towards 98.
In cells N-D-N and E-D-N, the slopes are negative and the constants are positive. They are
signi￿cant at the 1% level. The joint F-statistic tests of slopes and constants are also signi￿cant
at the 1% level. The medians of the pooled winning bids in the last ￿ve periods across the
sessions are 100.5 and 98 in cells N-D-N and E-D-N, respectively. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
do not reject the null hypothesis that the medians of the pooled winning bids in the last ￿ve
periods across the sessions coincide with 98 in cells N-D-N and E-D-N (two-tailed p-values
are 0.062 and 1.000, respectively). These results support that winning bids converge towards
98. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported in the nondisclosure condition. Hence, we obtain the
following result.
RESULT 5. In the different cost condition, the winning bids in the FPA with EMP and the
standard FPA do not converge towards the theoretical prediction in the disclosure condition, but
converge towards the theoretical prediction in the nondisclosure condition.
Next, we test Hypothesis 4. The average winning bids in cell E-D-N are higher than those
in cell N-D-N, except in Period 9. Wilcoxon rank sum tests reject the null hypothesis of no
difference in the medians of the winning bids between cells N-D-D and E-D-D (two-tailed p-
value = 0.000). On the other hand, the distribution of the average winning bids in cell E-D-D
appears to be similar to that in cell N-D-D. Wilcoxon rank sum tests do not reject the null
hypothesis of no difference in the medians of the winning bids between cells N-D-N and E-
D-N (two-tailed p-value = 0.463). Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is supported in the nondisclosure
condition but not in the disclosure condition. Hence, we obtain the following result.
12RESULT 6. In the different cost condition, the winning bids of the FPA with EMP are higher
than those of the standard FPA in the disclosure condition. However, the winning bids of the
FPA with EMP coincide with those of the standard FPA in the nondisclosure condition.
The above result implies that the information of subjects’ identi￿cations and bids affects
the winning bids. Next, we focus on the effect of this information within the same auction
institutions. Wilcoxon rank sum tests reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the medians
of the pooled winning bids between cells E-D-N and E-D-D (z-value = 3.88, two-tailed p-value
= 0.000), but do not reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the medians of the pooled
winning bids between cells N-D-N and N-D-D (z-value = ￿1.28, two-tailed p-value = 0.199).
Thus, we obtain the following result.
RESULT 7. In the different cost condition, the winning bids of the FPA with EMP in the
disclosure condition are higher than those in the nondisclosure condition. However, the winning
bids of the standard FPA in the nondisclosure condition coincide with those in the disclosure
condition.
Next, we compare E-D-N and E-D-D and consider why winning bids in cell E-D-N diverge
from the theoretical prediction. As we described in Section 2.2, in the different cost condition,
the FPA with EMP has many Case II Nash equilibria such that bi < ci; for some i; but it does
not have any Case I pure Nash equilibrium such that bi ￿ ci; for any i: The FPA with EMP
approximately achieves Case II Nash equilibria in the nondisclosure condition in the last ￿ve
periods but not in the disclosure condition in all the periods.
There are many 1 point bids in cell E-D-N, whereas there are three 1 point bids in cell E-D-
D. Speci￿cally, in cell E-D-N, Producers 7, 9, and 10 in Session 1, and Producer 4 in Session 2
repeatedly bid 1. The EMPs fell below 80 from Period 5, except in Period 10 in Session 1. In
cell E-D-D, however, nobody repeated a bidding of 1 from Period 5, and the EMPs were higher
than 105, except in Periods 6, 9, and 10 in Session 1.
According to the questionnaire sheets that we distributed after the experiment, Producers 4
and 10 who repeated a bidding of 1 in cell E-D-N changed their strategies during the course of
the experiment to reduce the payoffs of the producers whose costs are 97 by bidding extremely
low prices. Their motivation seems to be similar to the spiteful strategies de￿ned by Cason et
al. (2004) in the non-excludable public goods experiments. They de￿ne a strategy as being
a spiteful strategy ￿if he/she selects a strategy reducing both his/her own payoff and the other
subject’s payoff in comparison to the payoffs when he/she takes an own payoff-maximizing
strategy, given an expected strategy of the other subject￿29:
We expand this de￿nition to include the meaning of expected payoffs and apply it to the
incentive of repeated bidding of 1 for the producer whose cost is 150. Since bidding a price
lower than the cost has the risk of negative payoffs, the expected payoffs of the producer whose
cost is 150 are smaller when he/she bids 1 than when he/she bids 151, given any bid pro￿les.
The producer’s strategy of bidding 1, however, reduces not only his/her own expected payoffs
but also those of the producer whose cost is 97.
Given bidding prices of more than 150 from producers whose costs are 150, if producers
whose costs are 97 bid prices between 97 and 150, they can win, and the winner’s payoff ranges
from 1/3 to 5230. On the other hand, given a bidding price of 1 from producers whose costs
29 Cason et al. (2004), p. 89, l.4￿6.
30The minimum expected payoff is 1/3 if three producers, whose costs are 97, bid 98; the maximum expected
payoff is 52 if only one producer, whose cost is 97, bids 149 and wins.
13are 150, the expected payoff-maximizing strategy of producers whose costs are 97 is bidding
98, and their expected payoffs are 1/3 at the most. Thus, a bidding price of 1 from producers
whose costs are 150 is a spiteful strategy in view of expected payoffs. Thus, the nondisclosure
condition leads to a spiteful strategy, which motivates producers whose costs are 97 to bid prices
close to their costs so that the winning bids are close to their costs.
The disclosure condition, however, reduces the spiteful strategy of bidding 1 which leads
to Case II Nash equilibria. If producers whose costs are 97 do not assume extremely low bids
and assume that all producers bid prices higher than their costs, they have the incentive to bid
prices more than their cost not to be excluded by the EMP. Speci￿cally, consider a situation in
which a producer whose cost is 97 bids 150 and producers whose costs are 150 bid 151. In this
situation, if the remaining producers whose costs are 97 bid 98, they are excluded by the EMP
of 103. Thus, since producers whose costs are 97 bid prices more than their costs not to be
excluded, the winning bids in cell E-D-N diverge from their costs.
Next, we consider the market ef￿ciency de￿ned by the total surplus of the government and
producers. In view of the market ef￿ciency, the most ef￿cient case is that the producer whose
cost is 97 produces the goods and sells them to the government. In cell E-D-D, Producer 10
whose cost is 150 won with her bid of 151 in Period 10 of Session 1, and Producer 7 whose cost
is150wonatherbidof155inPeriod8ofSession2. TheseobservationsimplythattheFPAwith
EMP has a risk of losing market ef￿ciency when production costs are different if governments
disclose producers’ identi￿cations and bids. We compare the frequency of achieving the most
ef￿cient case between cells N-D-D and E-D-D. The proportion test does not reject the null
hypothesis of no difference in the frequencies of achieving the most ef￿cient case between cells
N-D-D and E-D-D (two-tailed p-value = 0.146). Hence, we obtain the following result.
RESULT 8. In the different cost condition, there is no difference in the market ef￿ciencies
between the FPA with EMP and the standard FPA.
In both the auction institutions, producers whose costs are 97 mostly win. Next, we compare
the frequencies of deciding winners by lottery between the FPA with EMP and the standard
FPA. The numbers pertaining to deciding the winners by lottery are 1 and 2 in cells E-I-D and
N-I-D, respectively. The proportion test does not reject the null hypothesis of no difference
in the frequencies of deciding the winners by lottery between cells E-D-D and N-D-D (two-
tailed p-value = 0.548). On the other hand, the numbers pertaining to deciding the winners by
lottery are 10 and 2 in cells E-D-N and N-D-N, respectively. The proportion test rejects the null
hypothesis of no difference in the frequencies of deciding the winners by lottery between cells
E-I-N and N-I-N (two-tailed p-value = 0.005). Hence, we obtain the following result.
RESULT 9. In the different cost condition, there is no difference in the frequencies of deciding
the winners by lottery between the FPA with EMP and the standard FPA in the disclosure
condition. However, the frequency of the FPA with EMP is higher than that of the standard FPA
in the nondisclosure condition.
The frequencies of deciding the winners by lottery in cell E-D-N is high and is the same as
those in cells in the identical cost condition. One possible reason why cell E-D-N induces high
frequencies is that the bidding price of 1 from producers whose costs are 150 lowers the EMP,
which allows producers whose costs are 97 to easily stay close to their costs of 97 relative to the
standard FPA. In the standard FPA, since there are only three producers whose costs are 97 and
the competition power is weak, they try to bid higher prices than their costs in order to increase
14their pro￿ts instead of bidding close to their costs to become the winner. If this interpretation is
correct, the existence of the EMP leads to having to decide the winners by lottery. This situation
is unexpected for Japanese local governments that wish to prevent deciding winners by lottery.
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we evaluate the performance of the FPA with EMP relative to the standard FPA
which does not have any minimum prices. Theoretically, in the identical cost condition, the
EMP expands the Nash equilibria of the FPA, and the FPA comes to include the Nash equilibria
such that bi <c; for some i: In the different cost condition, the EMP changes the Nash equilibria
of the FPA, and the FPA comes to hold only the Nash equilibria such that bi < c; for some i:
However, in both production cost conditions, since the EMP does not affect the winning bids of
the FPA in the Nash equilibria, the winning bids consistent with their costs which are the most
ef￿cient outcomes for the government and taxpayers to minimize their expenditures.
Intheexperiment, intheidenticalcostcondition, thewinningbidsinboththeFPAwithEMP
and the standard FPA are consistent with the cost; these values are not signi￿cantly different
regardless of the information of subjects’ identi￿cations and bids. Further, the EMP does not
affect the frequency of deciding the winners by lottery.
In the different cost condition, when the information of subjects’ identi￿cations and bids
is disclosed, the winning bids of the FPA with EMP diverge from the lowest cost and are sig-
ni￿cantly higher than those of the standard FPA. However, when the information of subjects’
identi￿cations and bids are not disclosed, the winning bids of the FPA with EMP and the stan-
dard FPA converge towards the theoretical predictions, and these values are not signi￿cantly
different. In latter case, the EMP increases the frequency of deciding the winners by lottery.
The EMP, however, does not affect market ef￿ciency de￿ned by the total surplus of the govern-
ment and producers.
In the different cost condition, the nondisclosure of subjects’ identi￿cations and bids leads
to bidding 1 point to reduce the payoffs of producers with the lowest cost, using the spiteful
strategy. This behavior lowers the EMP to below the lowest cost. Thus, producers with the
lowest cost bid prices close to their costs to win and winning bids converge toward the lowest
cost.
The disclosure condition, however, does not lead to bidding 1 point as the spiteful strategy,
and the EMP becomes higher than the lowest cost. Thus, producers with the lowest costs
raise their bids not to be excluded by the EMP; the winning bids diverge from the lowest cost.
Since the disclosure of subjects’ identi￿cations and bids reduces the bidding of 1 as the spiteful
strategy, it seems to be easier for subjects to adopt the spiteful strategy when their identi￿cations
and actions are hidden. In socio-psychology, Yamagishi (1988a; 1988b) ￿nd that the mutual
monitoring and sanctioning remove the free riding in Japan. In our different cost condition, the
mutual monitoring removes spiteful strategy, which makes the winning bids diverge from the
lowest cost.
These results suggest that auctioneers need to pay attention to the information control of
producers’ identi￿cations and bids when they employ the EMP. Isaac and Walker (1985) and
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002) also caution about the disclosure of information concerning
losing bids because this information reduces (increases) the auctioneer’s revenues (losses). Ad-
ditionally, our results are similar to those of Isaac and Plott (1981), Smith and Williams (1981),
Coursey and Smith (1983), and Gode and Sunder (2004), who reveal that non-binding price
15controls affect trading prices in the competitive market. Although the EMP does not affect
the winning bids of the FPA in theory, it affects them under the speci￿c information control
experiment.
Although more experimental work is needed to obtain precise results, if we can say that
concealing the identi￿cations and actions of subjects induces a spiteful strategy, which in turn
induces the ef￿cient outcome for the government and taxpayers, auction authorities have to take
steps to protect companies’ identi￿cations in the procurement procedures. To this end, sealed
bids by postal mail or via the Internet, recently employed by some Japanese local governments,
are useful in concealing who the bidder is. The EMP, however, does not have a critical impact
on the prevention of deciding winners by lottery, as expected by Japanese local governments.
Although our result calls the government’s attention to the EMP’s risk of inducing higher
winning bids and a higher frequency of deciding winners by lottery, our study cannot deny the
need of the EMP in procurement procedures because we restrict our attention to homogenous
goods. As we mentioned in the introduction, auctioneers began using the EMP to prevent buy-
ing abnormally low-quality goods. Next, we expand on Akai et al. (2009a), who explicitly
introduce quality into the procurement auction model, and evaluate whether the EMP prevents
the purchase of low quality goods and whether it increases social welfare in various environ-
ments.
Additionally, bid-rigging is a substantive problem, as Isaac and Walker (1985), Saijo et al.
(1996), and Kawagoe (2003) study. Since bidders can manipulate the EMP, this method is often
criticized for its tendency to collude in manipulating the EMP and excluding their rivals. A
simple way to manipulate the EMP is to create a dummy company. In fact, these problems are
concerned when Japanese local governments began employing the EMP. If auction authorities
follow our suggestions and do not disclose information about bidder’s identi￿cations and bids,
they can promote collusion or the creation of dummy companies and make it dif￿cult to state
that the auction institution is transparent and fair for public procurement. Our ￿nal goal is to
assess whether the EMP prevents the purchase of abnormally low-quality goods at a fair price
even if we allow bidders to conspire.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.
Step 1: More than one producers bid b￿. Suppose that only one producer bids b￿. This
winner can raise her bid to the price slightly less than the second lowest bid, b￿+ε < b2, and
increase her payoffs. This is a contradiction.
Step2: b￿ =c:Supposeb￿ >c:Case1: d(b)<b￿:Theproducerbiddingb￿ hasanincentive
to reduce her bid to b￿￿ε and increase her payoffs. This is a contradiction. Case2: d(b) = b￿:
If the producer bidding b￿ raises her bid to the price slightly less than the second highest bid,
b2￿ε; then since she can pull the minimum price above b￿ and exclude other producers bidding
b￿, she can increase her payoffs. This is a contradiction.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.
Step 1: More than one producers bid b￿. Suppose that only one producer bids b￿. This
winner can raise her bid to the price slightly less than the second lowest bid, b￿+ε < b2, and
increase her payoffs. This is a contradiction.
Step 2: The winner is a producer whose cost is c1. Suppose that the winner is a producer
whose cost is more than or equal to c3. Since b￿ > c3; the producer whose cost is c1 can raise
her bid to b￿ and increase her payoffs. This is a contradiction.
Step 3: c1 ￿b￿ <c3: Suppose b￿ <c1: Since the winner is the producer whose cost is c1 and
her payoffs are less than zero, she has an incentive to raise her bid to c1 and increase her payoffs.
This is a contradiction. Suppose b￿ ￿ c3: Case 1: d(b) < b￿: The producer whose cost is c1
has an incentive to reduce her bid to b￿￿ε; and increase her payoffs. This is a contradiction.
Case2: d(b) = b￿: If the producer whose cost is c1 raises her bid to the price slightly less than
the second highest bid, b2￿ε; then since she can pull the minimum price above b￿ and exclude
other producers bidding b￿, she can increase her payoffs. This is a contradiction.
Step 4: b￿ = c1: Suppose b￿ > c1: Case 1: d(b) < b￿: The producer whose cost is c1 has an
incentive to reduce her bid to b￿￿ε and increase her payoffs. This is a contradiction. Case2:
d(b) = b￿: If the producer whose cost is c1 raises her bid to the price slightly less than the
second highest bid, b2 ￿ε; then since she can pull the minimum price above b￿ and exclude
other producers bidding b￿, she can increase her payoffs. This is a contradiction.
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Table 1. An example of the EMP 
Ranking  of  bids 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  The  EMP The  winning  bid 
bids (before)  $100 $105 $130 $150 $160 $180 $200 $103  $105 
bids (after)  $100 $105 $149 $150 $160 $180 $200 $106 $149 
 








Information conditions of 
subjects’ identifications and bids
N-I-D 2  No  Identical  Disclosure 
E-I-D 2  Endogenous  Identical  Disclosure 
N-I-N 2  No  Identical  Nondisclosure 
E-I-N 2  Endogenous  Identical  Nondisclosure 
N-D-D 2  No  Different Disclosure 
E-D-D 2  Endogenous  Different  Disclosure 
N-D-N 2  No  Different  Nondisclosure 
E-D-N 2  Endogenous  Different  Nondisclosure 
 
Table 3. OLS regressions of winning bids on periods 
Cell N-D-D  E-D-D N-D-N E-D-N 
a  102.60*** (5.60)   131.77*** (5.49)  127.83*** (3.81)  131.20*** (4.66) 
b 0.40  (0.90)    －1.54* (0.88)    －3.23*** (0.61)  －4.05*** (0.75) 
F-statistic  0.20    3.03*  27.67***  29.18*** 
adjusted R
2  －0.04   0.10   0.58   0.60  
No.  of  Obs.  20   20   20   20  











Figure 1. Average winning bids and EMPs in the identical cost condition 
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Figure 2. Average winning bids and EMPs in the different cost condition 
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 Supplementary Material for
"An Experimental Study of Procurement Auctions
with Endogenous Minimum Prices"
This supplementary material has four sections. Section 1 provides the proof of Propo-
sition 3. Section 2 contains instructions and PC operation manuals. Sections 3 and 4
provide graphs and raw data of the entire experiments, respectively.
1. Proof of Proposition 3
Here, we show that there are no Case I pure Nash equilibrium in our setting. First we
describe four lemmas and use them for the proof of Proposition 3.
In the following model, when a bid pro￿le is b, producer i￿ s probability Xi(b) of selling
the good is : Xi(b) = 0 if bi > minfbj : bj ￿ d(b)g, and Xi(b) = 1=n0 if bi = minfbj : bj ￿
d(b)g, where n0 is the number of bids of argminfbj : bj ￿ d(b)g. When a bid pro￿le is
b, producer i￿ s (expected) payo⁄ is ui(b) = (bi ￿ ci) ￿ Xi(b), where ci is producer i￿ s cost
for the good considered. Following the experiment, we assume that bids are nonnegative
integers and that producer 1 has the lowest cost, producer 2 has the second lowest cost,
and so on, that is, c1 ￿ c2 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ cn. Given a bid pro￿le b; let b￿(b) be the winning bid
of b, that is, b￿(b) = minfbi : i 2 N and bi ￿ d(b)g.
Lemma 1: In a Nash equilibrium b such that bi ￿ ci for every i, no bid is excluded
by d(b), that is, b1(b) ￿ d(b).
Proof. Suppose that there is a bid bi excluded by d(b); that is, bi < d(b). Note
that ui(b) = 0: Let b bi = b￿(b). If producer i can be a winner by bidding b bi, that is,
b bi = minfbj : j 2 N and bj ￿ d(b bi;b￿i)g, then since b bi = b￿(b) ￿ d(b) > bi > ci, and
Xi(b bi;b￿i) > 0; it follows that ui(b bi;b￿i) = (b bi ￿ ci) ￿ Xi(b bi;b￿i) > 0 = ui(b): This is
a contradiction to Nash equilibrium. Let e bi = bm(b), that is, e bi is equal to the m￿th
lowest bid among fb1;:::;bng. Note that e bi > d(e bi;b￿i) ￿ d(b bi;b￿i) ￿ d(b): Thus, if
producer i cannot be a winner by bidding b bi, then producer i can be a winner by bidding
some bi 2 [b￿(b);bm(b)], and similarly he can obtain a positive ui(bi;b￿i): This is also a
contradiction to Nash equilibrium. QED
Remark: In the Nash equilibrium b such that bi ￿ ci for all i, b￿(b) = minfbi : i 2 Ng.
Lemma 2: Let bi ￿ ci for all i: In the Nash equilibrium b, for all i 2 N; if b￿(b) > ci,
bi = b￿(b).
Proof. Suppose that b￿(b) > ci, and bi 6= b￿(b) for some i 2 N: By Lemma 1, for all
i 2 N; bi ￿ b￿(b) ￿ d(b): Thus, bi > b￿(b) > ci: By bi > b￿(b); ui(b) = 0: Let b bi = b￿(b).
Note that d(b bi;b￿i) ￿ d(b) ￿ b￿(b) = b bi: By Lemma 1, for all j 2 N; bj ￿ b￿(b) = b bi: Thus,
producer i can be a winner by biddingb bi, that is,b bi = minfbj : j 2 N and bj ￿ d(b bj;b￿1)g.
Sinceb bi = b￿(b) > ci, and Xi(b bi;b￿i) > 0; it follows that ui(b bi;b￿i) = (b bi￿ci)￿Xi(b bi;b￿i) >
0 = ui(b): This is a contradiction to Nash equilibrium. Thus, for all i 2 N; if b￿(b) > ci,
bi = b￿(b). QED
Lemma 3: In the Nash equilibrium b such that bi ￿ ci for all i, if b￿(b) > maxfc1 +
2;c2g; then d(b) 2 (b￿(b) ￿ 1;b￿(b)]:
1Proof. Suppose b￿(b) > maxfc1+2;c2g and d(b) ￿ b￿(b)￿1: Since Lemma 2 implies
b1 = b2 = b￿(b), X1(b) ￿ 1=2. Thus, u1(b) = (b1 ￿ c1) ￿ X1(b) ￿ (b1 ￿ c1)=2: Note
b
￿(b) > c1 + 2 ) 2 ￿ fb
￿(b) ￿ c1g ￿ 2 > b
￿(b) ￿ c1
) fb
￿(b) ￿ 1 ￿ c1g > (b1 ￿ c1)=2.
By bidding b￿(b)￿1; producer 1 can be a single winner and can obtain the payo⁄(b￿(b)￿
1 ￿ c1) > (b1 ￿ c1)=2 = u1(b): This is a contradiction to Nash equilibrium. Thus, d(b) 2
(b￿(b) ￿ 1;b￿(b)]: QED
Lemma 4: In the Nash equilibrium b such that bi ￿ ci for all i, b1(b) = b￿(b) ￿ b2(b) ￿
b￿(b) + 1:
Proof. By Lemma 1, b1(b) = b￿(b) ￿ d(b): By de￿nition, b1(b) ￿ b2(b): Thus, we
show b2(b) ￿ b￿(b) + 1. Suppose b2(b) > b￿(b) + 1. Let i 2 N be such that bi = b1(b). Let
b bi = b￿(b)+1. Then, ui(b bi;u￿i) = b￿(b)+1￿ci > b￿(b)￿ci = ui(b): This is a contradiction
to Nash equilibrium. QED
Proposition 3: Let n = 10;m = 5;k = 4=5;c1 = c2 = c3 = 97;c4 = ￿￿￿ = c10 = 150.
There is no Case I pure Nash equilibrium bi ￿ ci, for every i.
Proof. Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium b such that bi ￿ ci for all i. Since bi ￿ ci
for all i, it follows that for all i 2 N; ci < bi and ci < bi(b). Note that b￿(b) ￿ b1(b) ￿
c1 = 98. We derive a contradiction in each of the following cases.
Case 1. b￿(b) ￿ 151: (b￿(b) ￿ c5 + 1:)
By Lemma 2 and b￿(b) > c5, b1 = ￿￿￿ = b5 = b￿(b). Thus, by Lemma 1, b1(b) = ￿￿￿ =
b5(b) = b￿(b), and so d(b) = (4=5) ￿ b￿(b). By Lemma 3, (4=5) ￿ b￿(b) > b￿(b) ￿ 1. This
inequality implies b￿(b) < 5. This is a contradiction to b￿(b) ￿ 151.
Case 2. 98 ￿ b￿(b) ￿ 150: (c3 + 1 ￿ b￿(b) ￿ c4:)
By Lemma 2 and b￿(b) > c3, b1 = b2 = b3 = b￿(b). Thus, by Lemma 1, b1(b) = b2(b) =
b3(b) = b￿(b), and so d(b) = (4=5) ￿ [3 ￿ b￿(b) + b4(b) + b5(b)]=5. Since bi ￿ ci, b4(b) ￿ 151
and b5(b) ￿ 151: Note that u3(b) = [b￿(b) ￿ 97]=3 ￿ [150 ￿ 97]=3.
By Lemma 3, b￿(b)￿1 < (4=5)￿[3￿b￿(b)+b4(b)+b5(b)]=5. Thus, [13￿b￿(b)￿25]=4 <
b4(b) + b5(b). Let b b3 = b4(b).
We show d(b b3;b￿3) > b￿(b) = b1 = b2. Suppose d(b b3;b￿3) ￿ b￿(b). Since [13 ￿ b￿(b) ￿
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￿ [30 ￿ b
￿(b) ￿ 100].
Thus, if d(b b4;b￿4) ￿ b￿(b); then 1
25 ￿ [30 ￿ b￿(b) ￿ 100] < b￿(b). This inequality implies
b￿(b) < 20: This is a contradiction to b￿(b) ￿ 98: Thus, d(b b4;b￿4) > b￿(b) = b1 = b2 = b3:
Since d(b b4;b￿4) ￿ b5(b) = b b4; X4(b b4;b￿4) ￿ 1=2, and so
u4(b b4;b￿4) ￿ [b
5(b) ￿ c4]=2 ￿ [151 ￿ 150]=2 > 0 = u3(b):























































Therefore, d(b b3;b￿3) ￿ b4(b) = b b3. Thus, X3(b b3;b￿3) ￿ 1=2, and so
u3(b b3;b￿3) ￿ [b
4(b) ￿ c3]=2 ￿ [151 ￿ 97]=2 > [150 ￿ 97]=3 ￿ u3(b).
Since b is a Nash equilibrium, this is a contradiction.. QED
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2. Instructions and PC operation manuals 
 
Instructions (for cell E-I-D) 
 
  In this experiment, every subject makes a decision on selling the goods to the 
experimenter. Please understand the rules of the experiment well, make an appropriate 
decision, and earn as much rewards as possible. 
 
Outline of the experiment 
In this experiment, you will be assigned a role of a producer, and sell a “good” 
to the experimenter. The number of subjects participating in this experiment is 10 
people in total. Each subject acts the role of the producer. The computer acts as the 
experimenter. The experiment will be repeated 10 periods. In each period, the 
experimenter purchases a good from a producer according to pre-determined certain 
rules. Following explains the rules of purchasing a good for the experimenter acted by 
the computer and the role of a producer every subject acts.     
  
The purchasing rules of the experimenter 
First, we explain the purchasing rules of the experimenter acted by the 
computer. The experimenter purchases one unit of “good” from one of 10 producers 
according to the rules below. The purchasing rules of the experimenter are as follows. 
First of all, the experimenter asks all 10 producers to submit the selling prices 
for the good through computer display. Money used in this experiment is measured by 
“point” of a fictitious monetary unit. The experimenter purchases a good at the selling 
price less than or equal to 243 points. Therefore, the maximum selling price of you as 
the producer can submit to the experimenter is 243 pt. Note that selling prices you can 
submit are only integers. You have three minutes to input your selling price on your 
computer screen. Note that you cannot cancel the selling price once you have 
submitted it to the experimenter. 
Next, the experimenter selects five producers in the order of the lowest selling 
prices. The experimenter calculates the average selling price of these five producers. 
Then, this average is multiplied by 0.8. The experimenter selects one producer whose 
selling price is the lowest among all the producers who have submitted the selling 
prices higher than or equal to “0.8 × (average selling price of lowest five producers)”. 
The experimenter purchases the good from that producer at the selling price he/she 
has submitted.  5
If there are two or more producers who have submitted that price, then the 
experimenter randomly selects one of them and purchases the goods from that 
producer. 
 
Roles of producers 
We explain the role of the producer you act. Before the beginning of the 
experiment, every subject will be assigned to a producer’s identification number from 
1 to 10 by a lottery. Once you receive a producer’s number, that number will not 
change throughout the experiment.   
Each producer can produce one unit of good at “production costs”. The 
production cost of a good are common among all producers and it is 97 pt. The quality 
of the good any producers produce is same. 
When a producer is selected by the experimenter, he/she is to produce a good 
and sell it to the experimenter to get “sales revenues”. Since the unit of goods you can 
sell is one unit, the sales revenue is equal to the selling price to the experimenter, i.e. 
equal to the purchase price of the experimenter. The difference between the sales 
revenue and the production cost of the good is a “profit” the producer earns from the 
production and sales. That is, “profit = purchase price of the experimenter – production 
cost of the good.” 
However, producers who do not sell the good to the experimenter do not 
produce a good. In this case, these producers do not earn sales revenues but have no 
production cost incurred either, so his/her profit is 0 pt. 
 
Purchasing rules of the experimenter and an example of the way to calculate 
producers’ profits   
    This section explains the purchasing rules of the experimenter and the example 
of way to calculate producers’ profits by using actual numbers. Although the 
experimenter do not purchase any goods with the selling price higher than 243 points 
in the experiment, here we assume that the experimenter can purchase a good at the 
price higher than 243 points, and explain the example.   
For example, producers number 1 to 10 submit the following selling prices 
respectively as their selling prices: 3000 pt, 4000 pt, 5000 pt, 6000 pt, 7000 pt, 8000 pt, 
5000 pt, 3000 pt, 4000 pt and 9000 pt. Five lowest prices are 3000 pt = 3000 pt < 4000 
pt = 4000 pt < 5000 pt. The average of these prices is (3000 + 3000 + 4000 + 4000 + 
5000) / 5 = 3800 pt.  Multiplying this with 0.8, we get  3800 × 0.8 = 3040 pt. All the 
selling prices equal to or higher than this number are 4000 pt = 4000 pt < 5000 pt =  6
5000 pt < 6000 pt < 7000 pt < 8000 pt < 9000 pt. The lowest price is 4000 pt among 
them. However, there are two producers who have submitted 4000 pt of selling price. 
Therefore, one of them will be selected with the probability of 1/2, and that producer 
sells the good to the experimenter. 
At this point, the producer selected by the experimenter is to produce a good 
at the production cost of 97 pt so that this producer’s profit is 4000 – 97 = 3903 pt. All 
other producers’ profits are 0 pt. 
Let us repeat that, in the actual experiment, the experimenter purchases the 
good at the price lower than or equal to 243 pt. Every subject decide what selling price 
you are to submit to the experimenter, while taking account of what selling prices other 
producers submit, and try to earn as much rewards as possible. 
 
Completion of the experiment and the calculation of rewards 
Once all the producers submit their selling prices, the experimenter notify all 
producers  from whom the experimenter purchases a good according to the rules as we 
explained earlier. 
  The experimenter discloses the following 4 types of information to all 
producers: “producer’s identification number from whom the experimenter purchase a 
good”, “the purchasing price of the experimenter”, “average of five lowest selling 
prices”, and “0.8 × (average of lowest five selling prices)”. At this point, the first period 
finishes. Once the first period finishes, the second period will start with same 
procedures. At the time 10th period finishes this experiment is completed. 
After the end of the experiment, the rewards each subject receives is calculated 
from total profits of the producer each subject acts. Specifically, the rewards to each 
subject after the end of the experiment are calculated as the following formula.   
 
Rewards after the end of the experiment = (50 pt + Gross profit) × 30 Yen 
 
We explain about this formula in detail. At the beginning of the experiment, each 
subject is given 50 pt only once. Total profits as the sum of the profits of producer you 
act for 10 periods are added to the 50 pts. However, profits can be minus in the 
experiment. If you submit the selling price below the production cost and the 
experimenter purchases the goods at that selling price, your profit will be minus. If the 
total profits as the sum of profits for 10 periods are minus, it will be subtracted from 50 
pts given to you at the beginning of the experiment. Each subject receives the rewards in 
cash under the conversion rate of 1 pt = 30 yen. Please try to earn as much rewards as  7
possible. 
 
Above is the content of today’s experiment. During the experiment, do not 
talk to others, and follow orders of the experimenter. You make a decision in the 
experiment by the software that operates on the personal computer assigned to each 
subject. The attached “PC Operation Manual” describes how to operate the PC. We 
will explain about this manual after the next reading period of “questions and answers 
on instructions”.   
 
 
This part is for the different production cost condition. 
Roles of producers 
We explain roles of producers you act. Before the beginning of the experiment, 
every subject will be assigned to a producer identification number from 1 to 10 by a 
lottery. Once you receive a producer number, that number will not change throughout 
the experiment.   
Each producer can produce one unit of good at “production cost”. Production 
costs of a good are in the table below.   
 
Producer  No.  1 2 3 4  5  6 7 8 9 10 
Cost  150 pt 97 pt  150 pt 150 pt 97 pt 150 pt 150 pt 97 pt  150 pt  150 pt
 
Producer number 1 has the production cost of 150 pt, No. 2 has 97 pt, No. 3 
150 pt, No. 4 150 pt, No. 5 97 pt, No. 6 150 pt, No. 7 150 pt, No. 8 97 pt, No. 9 150 pt, 
and No. 10 150 pt. The quality of goods any producers produce is the same. 
When a producer is selected by the experimenter, he/she is to produce a good 
and sell it to the experimenter to get “sales revenue”. Since the unit of goods sold is one 
unit, the sales revenue is equal to the selling price to the experimenter, i.e. equal to the 
purchase price of the experimenter. The difference between the sales revenue and the 
production cost of the good is the “profit” the producer earns from the production and 
sales. In other words, “profit = purchase price of the experimenter – production cost of 
the good.” 
However, producers who do not sell the good to the experimenter do not 
produce a good. In this case, these producers do not earn sales revenue but have no 
production cost incurred either, so his/her profit is 0 pt. 
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Purchasing rules of the experimenter and an example of the way to calculate 
producers’ profits   
    This section explains the purchasing rules of the experimenter and the example 
of way to calculate producers’ profits by using actual numbers. Although the 
experimenter do not purchase any goods with the selling price higher than 243 points 
in the experiment, here we allow the experimenter to purchase a good at the price higher 
than 243 points and explain the example.   
For example, producers number 1 to 10 submit the following selling prices 
respectively as their selling prices: 3000 pt, 4000 pt, 5000 pt, 6000 pt, 7000 pt, 8000 pt, 
5000 pt, 3000 pt, 4000 pt and 9000 pt. Five lowest prices are 3000 pt = 3000 pt < 4000 
pt = 4000 pt < 5000 pt. The average of these prices is (3000 + 3000 + 4000 + 4000 + 
5000) / 5 = 3800 pt.  Multiplying this with 0.8, we get:  3800 × 0.8 = 3040 pt. All the 
selling prices equal to or higher than this number are 4000 pt = 4000 pt < 5000 pt = 
5000 pt < 6000 pt < 7000 pt < 8000 pt < 9000 pt. The lowest price is 4000 pt among 
them. However, there are two producers who have submitted 4000 pt of selling price. 
Therefore, one of them will be selected with the probability of 1/2, and that producer 
sells the good to the experimenter. 
At this point, if the producer with production cost of 97 pt is selected, then 
he/she produces a good at 97pt, so his/her profit is 4000 – 97 = 3903 pt. If the selected 
producer has the production cost of 150 pt, then he/she manufactures goods at the cost 
of 150 pt, and his/her profit is 4000 – 150 = 3850 pt. All other producers’ profits are 0 
pt. 
Let us repeat that, in the actual experiment, the experimenter purchases the 
good at the price lower than or equal to 243 pt. Every subject decide what selling price 
you are to submit to the experimenter, while taking account of what selling prices other 
producers submit, and try to earn as much rewards as possible. 
 
 
This part is for the nondisclosure condition. 
Completion of the experiment and the calculation of rewards 
Once all the producers submit their selling prices, the experimenter notify all 
producers  from whom the experimenter purchases a good according to the rules as we 
explained earlier. 
  The experimenter discloses the following 4 types of information to all 
producers: “producer’s identification number from whom the experimenter purchase a 
good”, “the purchasing price of the experimenter”, “average of five lowest selling  9
prices”, and “0.8 × (average of lowest five selling prices)”. At this point, the first period 
finishes. Once the first period finishes, the second period will start with same 
procedures. At the time 10th period finishes this experiment is completed. 
After the end of the experiment, the rewards each subject receives are 
calculated from total profits of the producer each subject acts. Specifically, the rewards 
to each subject after the end of the experiment are calculated as the following formula.   
 
Rewards after the end of the experiment = (50 pt + Gross profit) × 30 Yen 
 
We explain about this formula in detail. At the beginning of the experiment, each 
subject is given 50 pt only once. Total profits as the sum of the profits of producer you 
act for 10 periods are added to the 50 pt. However, profits can be minus in the 
experiment. If you submit the selling price below the production cost and the 
experimenter purchases the goods at that selling price, your profit will be minus. If the 
total profits as the sum of profits for 10 periods are minus, it will be subtracted from 50 
pts given to you at the beginning of the experiment. Each subject receives the rewards in 
cash under the conversion rate of 1 pt = 30 yen.   
The experimenter will not disclose to other subjects whom is assigned to which 
producer number during and after the experiment. Therefore, try to earn as much 




This part is for cells E-I-N and N-I-N. 
Completion of the experiment and the calculation of rewards 
After the end of the experiment, the rewards for each subject are calculated 
from total profits of the producer each subject acts. Although every subject cannot 
know the formula to calculate the rewards, that formula is common among all subjects 
and have a feature that greater the total profit of the producer you act the greater the 
rewards. 
At the beginning of the experiment, the profit of each producer is 0 pt. If you 
submit the selling price below the production cost and the experimenter purchases the 
goods at that selling price, your profit will be minus. Even if the total profits are 0 pt or 
minus, each subject is guaranteed to receive the minimum rewards. We cannot tell you 
how much the minimum rewards are. The rewards paid to the subject with the negative 
total profits are the same regardless of how big the negative profits are. Moreover, the  10
subject with the negative total profits and the subject with 0 pt will receive the same 
minimum rewards. 
The experimenter will not disclose to other subjects whom is assigned to which 
producer number during and after the experiment. Therefore, try to earn as much 

































PC operation manuals (for the endogenous minimum price condition) 
 
  In the experiment, each subject sells a good to the experimenter by using the PC 
assigned to each of them. We explain screens of the software we use in the experiment and how 





  As soon as period 1 starts, the experimenter asks each producer to submit a 
selling price. Screen 1 is shown in the screen of the PC in front of every subject. 
  Please see screen 1. In the center of this screen, “your producer’s number”, “your 
production cost”, and a cell you submit a “selling price” are displayed. In this example, the cell 
of “your producer’s number” displays producer 1. Producer 1’s production cost is 150 pt so that 
the cell of “your production cost” displays 150 pt. Any subjects submit integers between 1 pt 
and 243 pt (limits included). Every subject inputs the selling price and then writes that 
selling price in the cell in the record sheet. After you complete writing, click OK button in 
the upper-right corner of the screen. Note you can neither cancel nor correct once you 
Period 
Remaining time (sec.)
your producer’s number 
your production cost 
the selling price  12
click OK button. Please pay attention about it carefully. 
  Additionally, “period” in the upper-left corner of the screen displays what period is in 
the experiment. In screen 1, it displays “1/10” as shown period 1. “Remaining period” in the 
upper-right corner of the screen displays how long you have left for submitting a selling price to 
the experimenter. Any subjects input the selling prices within 3 minutes (180 seconds). You 
necessarily input the selling price. The experimenter encourages subjects who do not input yet 
after the remaining time elapse 0 to input the selling price. Notice once all subjects click OK 





  If the experimenter purchases the good from you, screen 2 is displayed. From the 
top of the display, “your producer’s number”, “the experimenter buys a good from you”, 
“purchasing price of the experimenter”, “production cost”, and “your profits” are displayed. In 
this example, the cell of “your producer’s number” displays producer 1. Producer 1’s production 
cost is 150 pt so that the cell of “your production cost” displays 150 pt. Numerical numbers are 
displayed in the white box cells of the right side of the “purchasing price of the experimenter” 
and “your profit”. 
period 
your producer’s number   
the experimenter buys a good from you 
purchasing price of the experimenter 
your production cost 
your profits 
Remaining time (sec.) 13
  Every subject, in the actual experiment, transcribes the numerical number 
displayed at the right side of “your profit” on the record sheet. After the transcription, 
please click OK button in the lower-left corner of the screen.   




  If the experimenter does not purchase the good from you, screen 3 is displayed. From 
the top of the display, “your producer’s number”, “the experimenter does not buy a good from 
you”, “purchasing price of the experimenter”, “production cost”, and “your profits” are 
displayed. “Your profit” will be 0 pt. 
  Every subject, in the actual experiment, transcribes the numerical number 
displayed at the right side of “your profit” on the record sheet. After the transcription, 
please click OK button in the lower-left corner of the screen. 
your producer’s number 






  After the experimenter decides from whom he buy the good, he disclose “producer’s 
identification number from whom the experimenter purchase a good”, how much “the 
purchasing price of the experimenter” is, how much “average of five lowest selling prices” is, 
and how much “0.8 × (average of lowest five selling prices)” is. These information are 
displayed from the top of screen 4. Here we show the case where we purchase the good from 
producer 1 as an example. Numerical numbers are displayed in the white box cells of the right 
side of the “purchasing price of the experimenter”, “average of five lowest selling prices”, and 
“0.8 × (average of lowest five selling prices)”. 
  Every subject transcribes these information from the top on the cells of 
“producer’s number from whom the experimenter purchased the good”, “the purchasing 
price of the experimenter”, “average of five lowest selling prices”, and “0.8 × (average of 
lowest five selling prices)” in the record sheet. After the transcription, please click OK 
button in the lower-left corner of the screen. Once everybody click OK button, period 1 is 
completed and period 2 will start. The operation after period 2 is the same as one in period 
1. The experiment is completed at the time when period 10 is completed. 
your producer’s number 
the experimenter buys a good from producer 
the purchasing price of the experimenter 
The average of five lowest selling price 
0.8 × (average of lowest five selling prices) 
period  15
 
This is the end of explain the PC operation manuals. 
 
  16
3. All graphs in each cell 
In all graphs, the horizontal axis represents the number of periods, and vertical axis 
represents the price of bids. Winning bids are connected by a straight line, and these 
values are presented right next to the winning prices. Squares connected by a straight 
line represent the EMPs. In each graph of the identical condition, diamonds with 
numbers 1 to 10 represent bids of producers 1 to 10, respectively. In each graph of the 
different cost condition, diamonds with 2 (97), 5 (97), and 8 (97) represent bids of 
producers 2, 5 and 8 whose costs are 97, respectively. Triangles with identification 
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Figure S4. E-I-N 
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Figure S7. N-D-N 
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4. Row date in each cell 
 
   Period 
Producer's ID (cost)  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
N-I-D: session 1                     
1 (97)  109  103  99*  100  98*  99*  99  98  98  97 
2  (97)  143  101* 104  98*  103  99 99 98 98 98 
3  (97)  125  115  100 100 100 100 100 123 123 123 
4  (97)  125  125  125 123 105 126 156 99  98  100 
5 (97)  178  135  240  100  243  200  98  98  98  98 
6  (97)  140  106  115 107 112 102 99  99  97* 112 
7  (97)  117  108  106 105 105 105 98* 98  98  76* 
8  (97)  110  104  107 100 99  100 100 100 100 100 
9  (97)  106*  112  114 121 122 121 101 100 98  98 
10  (97)  118  102  101 100 98  100 100 98* 98  98 
N-I-D: session 2                                         
1  (97)  145  119  121 163 109 243 98  99  121 106 
2  (97)  147  99  147 147 117 107 107 107 107 107 
3  (97)  106  104  99  97* 99  98  98* 97* 98  98 
4  (97)  117  117  117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
5  (97)  104  98*  98 98 98 98*  98 98 98 98 
6 (97)  194  121  120  120  197  197  98  98  98  98 
7  (97)  200  110  98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
8  (97)  146  145  145 145 145 117 117 200 200 105 
9  (97)  104  100  100 100 100 100 200 210 220 242 
10  (97)  100* 100  98*  98 98*  98 98 98 98*  98* 
N-I-N: session 1                     
1 (97)  98*  98  97  97*  97  97*  98  97*  98  98 
2  (97)  115  98*  98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
3  (97)  130  98  98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
4  (97)  120  120  120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
5  (97)  124  98  98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
6  (97)  99  98  98 98 98 98 98 98 98 1* 
7 (97)  127  98  98  98  96*  97  97*  97  97*  96 
8  (97)  117  117  98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
9 (97)  177  243  97*  100  200  98  98  98  120  97 
10  (97)  143  105  98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
N-I-N: session 2                                         
1  (97)  199  97*  97*  98 98 200  98 97 200  97* 
2  (97)  222  190  150 97* 120 120 100 100 100 98 
3  (97)  199  169  98 100  98 98 98 98 98 98 
4  (97)  147  98  98 97 97 96*  98 97*  98 98 
5  (97)  119  100  100  100  98 100  98 98 98 98 
6  (97)  98*  99  98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
7  (97)  190  120  100  100  98 98 98 98 98*  98 
8  (97)  199  199  243 200 200 200 200 197 197 197 
9  (97)  120  98  98 98 97*  97 97*  97 98 98 
10  (97)  110  98  98 98 98 200  98 98 98 98 




   Period 
Producer's  ID  (cost) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
N-D-D:  session  1            
1  (150)  152 155 151 153 151 152 152 151 151 243 
2  (97)  127  107* 100* 106* 117  106* 107  100* 105* 99* 
3  (150)  200 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
4  (150)  160 155 151 151 243 151 151 151 151 151 
5  (97)  198 168 168 168 168 155 107*  128 106 243 
6  (150)  152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 
7  (150)  160 151 158 155 160 151 243 161 151 155 
8  (97)  119*  107 126 135 111*  111 128 108 111 109 
9  (150)  243 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 151 
10  (150)  151 151 200 155 155 155 155 155 200 200 
N-D-D: session 2            
1  (150)  163 243 243 237 238 226 199 239 237 155 
2  (97)  142 120 141 150 109 109 151 151 149 125 
3  (150)  150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 149 
4  (150)  160 155 200 240 180 230 243 240 155 184 
5  (97)  99* 99  98* 100*  109 105 99  98* 151 120 
6  (150)  200 160 160 243 243 243 242 240 239 160 
7  (150)  169 168 242 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 
8  (97)  106  98*  114  111  100* 100* 98*  105  147* 98* 
9  (150)  160 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 
10  (150)  155 155 154 160 154 153 153 151 153 160 
N-D-N:  session  1            
1  (150)  151 150 152 151 151 150 151 143 151 141 
2  (97)  136*  149 127*  150 114*  140 119 109 109 103* 
3  (150)  155 155 151 151 151 151 151 200 151 151 
4  (150)  170 155 155 151 155 155 160 160 152 151 
5  (97)  137 125*  135 124*  130 120 106*  117 105*  106 
6  (150)  180 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
7  (150)  197 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
8  (97)  160 150 130 125 117 110*  125 107*  117 104 
9  (150)  200 170 151 150 230 240 199 240 240 240 
10  (150)  185 160 170 155 151 243 170 243 155 160 
N-D-N: session 2            
1  (150)  243 243 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
2  (97)  135 119 106*  108 100 98* 98* 99  98* 98 
3  (150)  151 150 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
4  (150)  158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 
5  (97)  138 118*  107 102*  102 101 100 99  98  98* 
6  (150)  187 152 150 180 160 160 160 160 160 160 
7  (150)  200 180 230 170 190 210 220 160 215 200 
8  (97)  129*  122 112 104 99* 106 99  98* 107 102 
9  (150)  151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
10  (150)  200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
* shows the winning bids.           
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   Period 
Producer's  ID  (cost)  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
E-I-D:  session  1             
1  (97)  160  99* 98  98* 98* 243 98  98* 194 100 
2  (97)  196  150 243 243 243 243 147 147 127 127 
3  (97)  130  115 130 130 200 243 130 243 243 104 
4  (97)  126  126 243 243 243 243 243 222 111 7 
5  (97)  100*  99 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
6  (97)  200  127 110 147 137 98  137 147 140 101 
7  (97)  105  105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
8  (97)  158 104  102  99 98 98 98 98 98 98* 
9  (97)  160  160 243 243 243 150 150 1  222 109 
10  (97)  117  115 98* 107 127 97* 98* 118 98* 102 
EMP  92.5  83.5 80.2 81.1 84.2 79.4 79.5 64  81.6 64.6 
E-I-D: session 2                                         
1  (97)  150  105 100 101 160 115 101 145 98  98 
2  (97)  194  143 106 125 90* 127 120 120 145 175 
3  (97)  49  130 90* 95* 95  99  100 98  98* 98 
4  (97)  153 78*  100  98 98 110  98 98*  98 98 
5  (97)  98* 105  110  99 98 98 98*  98 98 98 
6  (97)  153 120  100  99 98 98 98 98 98 98 
7  (97)  147  122 107 98  98  130 100 243 243 98* 
8  (97)  160  138 104 99  98  98* 103 100 150 98 
9  (97)  130  98  102 98  98  98  150 140 176 111 
10  (97)  127  101 104 120 115 115 114 98  98  98 
EMP  88.2  77.9 78.7 78.1 76.6 78.6 79  78.4 78.4 78.4 
E-I-N: session 1                                         
1  (97)  98* 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
2  (97)  110 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
3  (97)  159  125 98  98  90* 98* 101 98  98* 98 
4  (97)  1  1  98 98 98 1  98 98*  98 98 
5  (97)  120  105 100 99  98  98  98* 98  100 98 
6  (97)  140 98 97*  99 98 243  1  98 243  98 
7  (97)  150 100  99 99 97 98 98 98 98 99 
8  (97)  163 100  70 95*  98 98 98 98 98 98* 
9  (97)  169  1  98  100 100 100 1  98  100 100 
10  (97)  104 98*  98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
EMP  69.3  47.4 73.8 77.9 77  62.9 47.4 78.4 78.4 78.4 
E-I-N: session 2                                         
1  (97)  120 110  100  99 98 97 97 97*  97*  97 
2  (97)  116 100  98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
3  (97)  168 98 98 98 98 97*  98 98 98 98 
4  (97)  150 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
5  (97)  104 98*  97*  97 97*  97 98 98 98 98 
6  (97)  125 115  98 98 98 98 98 98 98 97* 
7  (97)  140 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 97 97 
8  (97)  133 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
9  (97)  98* 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
10  (97)  136  109 98  96* 97  97  97* 2  97  98 
EMP  90.1  78.4 78.2 77.9 78.1 77.8 78.1 62.9 77.9 77.9 





   Period 
Producer's  ID  (cost)  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
E - D - D :   s e s s i o n   1             
1  (150)  159 151 243 243 243 152 243 243 151 151 
2  (97)  180 147 119* 119* 128* 135 119 121*  125 117*
3  (150)  153 155 160 220 243 243 243 243 243 180 
4  (150)  160 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
5  (97)  165 121* 124 149 110 131 118 115 150 120 
6  (150)  165 155 180 200 220 225 190 243 240 230 
7  (150)  152 151 151 151 243 243 243 230 220 219 
8  (97)  110 150 120 108 112 120* 115*  113 117*  118 
9  (150)  155 155 154 210 210 230 222 222 222 222 
10  (150)  151*  152 151 151 242 243 243 243 225 200 
EMP  115 115 106 108 114 110 111 116 111 105 
E-D-D: session 2                                         
1  (150)  180 155 160 170 160 200 200 200 198 195 
2  (97)  175 138 142 126* 119* 125 113 105 122 146 
3  (150)  158 155 243 243 243 1  243 243 243 155 
4  (150)  159 167 230 243 180 180 243 243 1  1 
5  (97)  120*  200 200 140 130 115* 130 115 121 110 
6  (150)  163 195 160 243 243 243 160 190 243 154 
7  (150)  163 160 161 155 156 156 156 155*  159 163 
8  (97)  135 135* 132* 127 137 180 111*  199 115*  110*
9  (150)  170 200 200 225 243 243 243 243 243 180 
10  (150)  160 160 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 200 
EMP  117 119 121 115 112 92.3  107 122 82.9  83.4 
E-D-N: session 1                                         
1  (150)  157 153 200 152 165 151 170 151 240 160 
2  (97)  148*  141* 150 128 108* 104 102 98* 98  98* 
3  (150)  193 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 
4  (150)  152 151 151 243 243 243 151 243 243 160 
5  (97)  112 107 130* 129 119 98* 98  102 98* 103 
6  (150)  156 153 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 
7  (150)  159 151 155 150 1  1  153 155 200 151 
8  (97)  150 150 138 120* 111 103 98* 98  98  98 
9  (150)  155 160 155 175 243 3  1  155 240 1 
10  (150)  151 151 243 243 243 1  1  1  1  1 
EMP  114  112  116  109  79 33 48 72 72 48.2 
E-D-N: session 2                                         
1  (150)  180 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
2  (97)  120 120 110* 108 104* 102 99  98  98* 98* 
3  (150)  157 170 184 198 190 185 188 180 178 181 
4  (150)  158 158 243 243 1  1  1  1  1  158 
5  (97)  118*  109* 103 108* 104 100 98* 98  243 98 
6  (150)  151 151 151 200 200 160 160 160 160 160 
7  (150)  243 243 151 243 151 151 151 151 243 243 
8  (97)  180 130 130 125 106 100* 102 98* 98  98 
9  (150)  181 155 170 151 155 161 240 155 153 241 
10  (150)  175 155 190 151 149 140 135 130 125 120 
EMP  113 106 103 103 74.2  70.9  69.6  68  75.7  90.4 
*  shows  the  winning  bids.            
 